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Abstract
What degree of tax autonomy should be granted to a taxing authority? Although
the policy maker aims at maximizing social welfare, her tax policy may be distorted
by the lobbying activity of taxpayers. In this political environment we characterize
the conditions under which social welfare can be increased by restricting the set of
tax instruments available to the policy maker, i.e. the degree of tax autonomy. We
show that full tax autonomy is more costly, in terms both of welfare distortions
and lobbying e¤ort, when the lobbies are asymmetric in size, while minimal tax
autonomy is more costly when the tax bases are asymmetric across di¤erent groups.
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1 Introduction
Actual tax systems are generally complex. In order to achieve a progressive tax burden,
personal income taxes are usually non-linear relation, with average tax rates increasing
in income. Furthermore, a plethora of tax allowances and tax credits adapt the nal
tax burden to the source of income (e.g., employee or self-employed), the taxpayers
household composition (e.g., number of children), the occurrence of particular outlays
(e.g., medical expenses, insurance premiums). Although usually characterized by a
simple proportional structure, corporate taxes and consumption taxes are also complex.
Regarding corporate taxation, reduced tax rates may apply to particular sectors of the
economy and, more importantly, rules dening the tax base (i.e., prots) tend to be
complex, since most of the items entering the denition of taxable income are subject
to evaluation (e.g., investment allowances, inventories). As for indirect taxes (like the
RST in the U.S., or the VAT in Europe), they are usually characterized not only by
di¤erentiated tax rates on di¤erent types of goods and services, but also by exemptions
for particular sectors (e.g., health) and by exemption thresholds for small businesses.
Since the pioneering works of Mirrlees [22] and Diamond and Mirrlees [7], a sub-
stantial literature on optimal taxationhas shown that complex taxes can be justied
both on e¢ ciency and equity grounds.1 Given its normative approach, according to
which policy makers behave as benevolent social welfare maximizers, this theoretical
paradigm implies that an increase of the complexity of tax structures is never harmful
for social welfare.2 In other words, there is no reason, within this type of framework,
for limiting or constraining the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the decision maker in
shaping the details of the tax structure.
Another strand of the literature, mainly adopting a positive perspective, has focused
on the political determinants of tax systems. In particular, Hettich and Winer [15],
Dixit and Londregan [9], [10], [11] and [12], and Warskett, Winer and Hettich [29], rely
on probabilistic voting theory to explain why taxes take a complex structure. Political
parties engaged in electoral competition tend to give a more favorable tax treatment
to groups of voters that are characterized by a larger proportion of swingvoters.3 In
1The classical textbook account of the optimal taxation paradigm is Atkinson and Stiglitz [1] and,
more recently, Myles [24]. Two important and recent contributions on the characterization of the
optimal non-linear income tax are Saez [25] and [26].
2Optimal tax theory typically ignores the costs of administering the tax system. Simplicityand
e¢ cient administrationare often informally invoked among the merits of at taxes(see Keen, Kim
and Varsano [18] for a throughout account of the long lasting debate over at taxes). Only few
theoretical studies account for the fact that a more complex tax structure involves higher administration
costs (see, e.g. Yitzhaki [31] and Mayshar [21]).
3Somewhat related is the literature investigating the link between redistribution through public
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contrast to optimal tax theory, within this political environment greater complexity of
the tax structure is generally detrimental for social welfare, since political forces do
not necessarily pursue e¢ ciency and equity objectives. However, none of these studies
considers the possibility of restricting the tax autonomy of the policy maker, in order
to assess whether simpler (i.e., more restricted) tax structures lead to better social
outcomes.
In this paper we focus on a concept of autonomy that refers to the possibility of
shaping tax schedules. We examine from a normative perspective whether it is desirable
to restrict the tax autonomy of a policy maker in its administration of a tax that serves
both the nancing of a public good and the pursuit of equity objectives, given that
political inuence may distort tax policy away from the optimum.4 In this respect, our
approach is di¤erent from that commonly adopted by the swing voters literature (e.g.,
Dixit and Londregan [9], [10]) in that, here, it is not the policy maker that distorts
tax policy in order to please high clout groups. Rather, taxpayers themselves exert
political pressure to a¤ect the decision makers tax policy.
In our model, a policy maker is entitled to levy a tax on a tax base that is positively
correlated with the full income (ability to pay) of taxpayers. Taxation is restricted to
be linear but, in principle, it is possible to tax di¤erently groups that have di¤erent
observable characteristics (such as source of income, rural or urban residence, etc.).
We then study under what conditions it is optimal to prevent the decision maker from
imposing di¤erent tax schedules on di¤erent groups.
Our crucial assumption is that tax setting is not driven by pure social welfare max-
imization. Instead, various groups of taxpayers exert political pressure, by means of
lobbying activities, with the aim of gaining a more favorable tax treatment.5 When lob-
expenditure and electoral systems (Myerson [23], Lizzeri and Persico [20] and Crutzen and Sahuguet
[5]). In this models, complexity refers to the di¤erentiation of public transfers to di¤erent groups of
voters.
4The policy maker in charge of tax policy can belong either to the central or to the local level
of government. As for the latter, the literature on scal federalism has identied several reasons for
limiting the tax autonomy of local governments, but none has yet focused on the one addressed in
this paper. These include e¢ ciency arguments, like tax competition among governments belonging to
the same layer which gives rise to horizontal tax externalities (see, e.g., Wilson [30] and Zodrow and
Mieszkowski [32]), and tax competition between di¤erent layers of government sharing the same tax
base which gives rise to vertical tax externalities (Keen [17], Keen and Kotsogiannis [19] and Dahlby
and Wilson [6]). The literature o¤ers also arguments in favor of scal autonomy. The classical argument
(see, e.g., Tiebout [27] and Brennan and Buchanan, [4]) is that scal autonomy promotes competition
among local governments that hinders their tendency to act as Leviathan revenue maximizers.
5 In most political economy applications, lobbying behavior is modeled using the buying inuence
approach of the common agency games developed by Dixit, Grossman and Helpman [8] and Grossman
and Helpman [13], [14]. In this paper, we use a simpler model of lobbying behavior in the spirit of
3
bying groups successfully inuence policy choices, the resulting tax policy is distorted
away from the social optimum, provided that the opposing parties do not o¤set each
other in their attempts to gain inuence. Even when the battle for political inuence
does not distort the tax structure, ine¢ ciencies arise because resources are wasted in
lobbying. In this setting, restricting the set of the available tax instruments  i.e.,
restricting tax autonomy may be welfare improving.
We show that under full tax autonomy (allowing for group-specic tax schedules)
the lobbying activity concentrates on group-specic subsidies, hence distorting income
distribution between groups, while tax rates are una¤ected by lobbying and can there-
fore be used to optimally redistribute income inside groups. On the contrary, when
tax autonomy is minimal (i.e., when the tax schedule is restricted to be uniform across
groups), lobbying distorts all tax instruments, hence a¤ecting income distribution both
inside and between groups. In fact we show that, under full tax autonomy, the extent
of the distortion away from the social optimum is related to the asymmetry in the size
of the di¤erent lobbying groups. When tax autonomy is large, relatively small groups
have higher incentives to lobby and therefore also have higher size-adjusted political
inuence than relatively large groups; as observed above, under full tax autonomy
the lobbying activity is essentially directed to increase group-specic subsidies. When
tax autonomy is restricted, group-specic subsidies become impossible. Redistribution
from one group to another, however, is still possible: by setting a uniform tax rate
and a uniform subsidy, groups with a tax base higher than average end up subsidizing
groups with a tax base lower than average. Thus, under minimal tax autonomy, the
lobbying activity is related to the distance of the groups average tax base from the
overall average tax base. In particular, groups with an average tax base equal to the
overall average have no incentive to lobby and economies in which average tax bases are
similar across lobbying groups end up not su¤ering much distortion from the lobbying
activity.
The basic message of the paper is that restricting tax autonomy is likely to improve
social welfare whenever the di¤erent lobbying groups are asymmetric in size and the
tax base is evenly distributed or, more precisely, when the average values of the group
specic tax bases are close to the global average. More tax autonomy is instead desirable
when tax bases are asymmetrically distributed and the lobbying groups are of similar
size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in Section 2,
where we specify the types of tax structures available to the policy maker and the
process leading to tax setting as a result of the interplay between the policy maker
Becker [2], that can be interpreted as a reduced form of the common agency models.
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and the taxpayers organized in lobbying groups. In Sections 3 and 4 we examine the
scal policies that emerge under the two polar tax environments of Full Tax Autonomy
(FTA) and Minimal Tax Autonomy (MTA). Section 5 is devoted to a comparison of
the two regimes looking at global welfare. Section 6 concludes. An appendix collects
all the proofs.
2 A Model of Tax Policy
We consider a population partitioned into J groups according to some observable char-
acteristics (e.g., source of income, area of residence and so on). Group j has mass
j 2 (0; 1), with
PJ
j=1 j = 1. There is heterogeneity inside groups but the members of
each group have to be treated uniformly by the tax policy. The type of each agent is
given by a triplet (;B; ), where  denotes a measure of the agents ability to pay (e.g.,
income or wealth), B is the tax base on which the policy maker can levy a tax, and  is
the unit benet the agent receives from the public good provided by the government.
We assume that B is an imperfect measure of an agents ability to pay, so that in
expected terms a taxpayer with a high ability to pay  also has a high tax base B.
Assumption 1 (i) For each group j, the distribution fj is such that covj (;B) > 0.
(ii) For the entire population, cov (;B) > 0. (iii) For each group j and for each
variable the variance is strictly positive.
The imperfection of B is a common feature of real tax systems, due to the presence of
tax-base measurements errors or to tax evasion and tax avoidance phenomena.
We also assume that the public good unit-benet  is private information. If G
units of the public good are produced then an agent of type (;B; ) receives a benet
G, and the cost of public good provision for the community is G. We assume that for
each group j the average benet j of the public good is higher than the constant cost
of production.
Assumption 2 j > 1 for each group j.
Notice that Assumption 2 implies that
PJ
j=1 jj =  > 1. We do not make assump-
tions about the relation, in expected terms, between the benets  and the tax base
B or the ability to pay , since both positive and negative correlations are possible in
practice.6 As our focus is on tax policy, we take the supply of the public good to be
6For instance, in the case of re and police protection, those with higher property values and incomes
have more to benet from public expenditure. The correlation is instead negative if, for instance, G
is interpreted as public schooling and rich households are more likely to send their children to private
schools.
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given exogenously.7
In each group j, the distribution of types is given by the known density fj (;B; )
on the set R3+. Denoting with Ej [g (x)] the expected value of g (x) for group j, let
xj = Ej [x] , varj (x) = Ej
h
(x  xj)2
i
, covj (x; y) = Ej [xy]  xjyj ,
be the average value of x, the variance of x, and the covariance between x and y for
group j, respectively. For the entire population, let
x =
JX
j=1
jxj , var (xj) =
JX
j=1
j (xj   x)2 , var (x) =
JX
j=1
jvarj (x) + var (xj) ,
cov
 
xj ; yj

=
JX
j=1
jxjyj   x y, cov (x; y) =
JX
j=1
jcovj (x; y) + cov
 
xj ; yj

.
The policy maker is only allowed to levy groupspecic linear taxes on B, with tax
rate tj and a lump sum subsidy Sj . The lump sum component can be either positive
or negative. Denote by t = (t1; : : : ; tJ) the vector of tax rates and by S = (S1; : : : ; SJ)
the vector of subsidies. The net utility for type (;B; ) of group j, at the given level
G of public good provision, is
u (tj ; Sj j;B;  ) = G+    tjB + Sj . (1)
Let
uj
 
tj ; Sj
j ; Bj ; j  = Ej [u] = jG+ j   tjBj + Sj (2)
be the average net utility for members of group j, and
u
 
t;S
;B;   = JX
j=1
juj = G+    T + S (3)
be the average net welfare for the population as a whole, where
T =
JX
j=1
jtjBj , S =
JX
j=1
jSj .
Finally, let
var (u) =
JX
j=1
jEj
h
(u  u)2
i
=
JX
j=1
jvarj (u) + var (uj) (4)
7We discuss the case of endogenous public good supply in Brusco, Colombo and Galmarini [3], where
we nd that limiting the tax autonomy of a local government may distort the supply of the local public
good away from its optimal level. Both under and over provision may occur, depending on whether
restricting tax autonomy increases or reduces the social marginal cost in terms of inequality of public
good provision.
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be the variance of net utilities, which is composed of the within-groups variance,PJ
j=1 jvarj (u), and of the between-groups variance, var (uj).
Taxes and subsidies are determined through a lobbying game, the outcome of which
can be described in reduced form as the maximization of the objective function
V (t;S) =
JX
j=1
qjuj   r var (u) , (5)
where qj is the modied weight of group j once lobbying activity is taken into account.
We assume that the modied weights are determined as
qj = h

j ;
pj
p

, (6)
where the function h captures the sensitivity of the policy makers to lobbying, pj is the
lobbying e¤ort exercised by group j and p is the average lobbying e¤ort. The lobbying
activity by group j will eventually be made endogenous and it depends on the overall
lobbying e¤ort by members of group j. At this stage, however, we take the values pj ,
and hence qj , as given. We make the following assumptions about the function h (j ; x).
Assumption 3 The function h (j ; x) is continuous and di¤erentiable for each x  0.
Furthermore: i) limx!0
@h(j ;x)
@x > 0 and
@h(j ;x)
@x is a continuous and bounded function
of x; ii) h (j ; 1) = j; iii) h

j ;
pj
p

2 [0; 1] and PJj=1 hj ; pjp  = 1 for each pair of
vectors (1; : : : ; J) and (p1; : : : ; pJ); iv)
@2h(j ;x)
@2x
 0.
Thus, the weight of group j increases when the group lobbying e¤ort gets larger com-
pared to the average lobbying e¤ort. When a group exerts an e¤ort equal to the average
then its weight is unchanged. The restrictions in iii) just make sure that qj remains
between 0 and 1 and that
P
qj = 1 for each vector of e¤orts; condition iv) says that
the marginal e¤ectiveness of the lobbying e¤ort decreases as the e¤ort gets larger.
Notice that, when written as a function of the vector (p1; : : : ; pJ), the function
h

j ;
pj
p

is well dened only if p 6= 0, i.e. at least one pj is strictly positive. This
problem is easily taken care of assuming that whenever p = 0 we have h

j ;
pj
p

= j .
A simple class of functions that meets all the conditions in Assumption 3 is
h

j ;
pj
p

= j
pj
p
+ (1  ) j
where  2 [0; 1] and can be used as a parameter denoting the e¤ectiveness of the
lobbying activity ( = 0 means that lobbying is completely ine¤ective).
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An observation that will be useful later is the following. Since the function h is
such that
H (1; : : : ; J ; p1; : : : ; pJ) =
JX
j=1
h

j ;
pj
p

= 1
for each vector (p1; : : : ; pJ), it has to be the case that @H@pi = 0 for each i. Now observe
that
@H
@pi
=
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
@

pi
p

@pi
+
X
j 6=i
@h

j ;
pj
p

@
pj
p
@

pj
p

@pi
= 0:
Using
@

pi
p

@pi
= p ipi
p2
and
@

pj
p

@pi
=   ipj
p2
, after rearrangement we obtain
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
= i
0@ JX
j=1
@h

j ;
pj
p

@
pj
p
pj
p
1A (7)
for each i. A more convenient way to write this equation is the following. Let  =
(1; : : : ; J) and p = (p1; : : : ; pJ), and dene
 (;p) =
JX
j=1
@h

j ;
pj
p

@
pj
p
pj
p
. (8)
Then (7) can be written as
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
= i (;p) ; (9)
that is, partial derivatives are proportional to the function , with coe¢ cient of pro-
portionality given by i.
A last remark is in order. In our formulation the intensity of lobbying by group j is
measured by the ratio pj=p. A possible alternative is to use the ratio jpj=p. However
this is equivalent, since we can always write a function that depends on j and jpj=p
as a function that depends on j and pj=p.
Coming back to expression (5), it can be thought as coming from a concave social
welfare function, with r > 0 determining the level of inequality aversion. However, the
weight qj given to group j is not determined purely by its size but also by its relative
political clout, as reected by the lobbying weight h

j ;
pj
p

.
We do not allow for debt, so that the tax and subsidy policy (t;S) has to satisfy
the budget constraint
G = T   S. (10)
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Since public expenditure is given, the tax and subsidy policy is obtained solving
max
t;S
V (t;S) s.t. (10). (11)
We want to analyze the welfare e¤ects of the following two tax regimes.
 Full Tax Autonomy (FTA): the policy maker is free to set di¤erent tax rates tj
and subsidies Sj for di¤erent groups.
 Minimal Tax Autonomy (MTA): the policy maker is forced to treat all groups
homogeneously. In other words, the decision maker can only choose a pair (t; S)
and then set tj = t, Sj = S for each group j.
Intermediate cases are also possible, such as those in which tax schedules can vary only
within a certain range. In this paper, our goal is to identify the e¤ect of a restriction
of tax autonomy on welfare, so we limit our attention to the two extreme cases. A
more complete analysis would include a discussion of the exact degree and format of
tax autonomy that maximizes social welfare.8
3 Full Tax Autonomy
We consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, given public expenditure, taxpayers exert
political inuence on the policy maker. In stage 2, tax policy is determined as outlined
above. The model is solved by backward induction.
3.1 Taxes and Subsidies under FTA
At stage 2, taking as given the pjs, the policy maker solves program (11). The result
is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under full tax autonomy, the optimal tax rate and subsidy for group j
are given by
tj =
covj (;B) +G covj (;B)
varj (B)
, (12)
Sj = t

jBj  G 
 
j   

G   j   + qj   j2rj . (13)
8 Immonen, Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala [16] and Viard [28] examine the optimal di¤erentiation of
income tax schedules among sub-groups of taxpayers in a classical optimal taxation framework, with
endogenous labor supply and a benevolent policy maker that maximizes a social welfare function. The
complexity of tax systems has also been investigated by Hettich and Winer [15] and Warskett, Winer,
and Hettich [29] in a probabilistic voting framework.
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The logic of the result is simple. In our framework taxes have no adverse e¤ect on the
income produced. If the planner could observe the type of each agent and establish
individual transfers then one simple way to solve program (11) would be to assign
lump-sum individualspecic subsidies. In fact, since the planner is inequality-averse,
a simple solution is to conscate entirely the income, nance the production of the
public good and then redistribute the remaining tax revenue compensating those who
have a lower preference for the public good. For a type (; ;B) this would lead to a
personalized marginal tax rate t (; ;B) = =B, for a total tax revenue of , and a
personalized subsidy
S (; ;B) =   G  (   )G,
where the rst term is the total tax revenue, G is the amount to be nanced and the
last term compensates those who derive low utility from the public good.
However, the planner does not observe the individual types but only the distribution
they are drawn from; i.e., the group j to which they belong. This leads to higher
subsidies for those groups with belowaverage income and belowaverage preference
for the public good. Since we allow for negative values of Sj , in principle all the
subsidies could be nanced via lump sum taxes, but a nonzero tax rate tj can be used
to reduce intragroup inequality. In fact, notice that if ,  and B were independent, so
that covj (;B) = covj (;B) = 0, then the optimal tax rate would be zero.9 However,
when there is correlation of either  or  with B then group-specic tax rates can
be used to decrease the variability of utility inside the group. If covj (;B) > 0 and
covj (;B) > 0 then individuals with a higher tax base B enjoy on average both a
higher ability to pay  and a higher utility from the public good . Setting a positive
tax rate and then distributing the tax revenue as a lump sum subsidy decreases the
inside-group variance. As observed, the job of tj is to redistribute income inside group
j, so that the political power of group j versus other groups is irrelevant.
Consideratuons of relative political power are instead important in determining the
lumpsum subsidy Sj . In fact, the subsidy to group j tends to equalize utility across
groups, much in the same way as individual lumpsum taxes and subsidies would do.
Thus, the subsidy compensates groups with lower than average taste for the public
good (j < ) and lower than average ability to pay (j < ). The last term in (13),
which depends on the relative political inuence qj   j , is the result of distortionary
lobbying activities and it is equal to zero when pj = p for each j.
9This does not mean that group j does not pay taxes, since Sj could be negative.
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Substituting tj and S

j from Proposition 1 into group j average utility (2), we get:
uj
 
tj ; S

j

= (   1)G+  + qj   j
2rj
. (14)
This shows that the only source of between-groups inequality is the presence of non-
uniform political weights. The average utility at the optimal policy is
JX
j=1
juj
 
tj ; S

j

= (   1)G+  +
JX
j=1
j
qj   j
2rj
= (   1)G+  (15)
and the between-groups variance
var
 
uj
 
tj ; S

j

=
1
4r2
var

qj   j
j

=
1
4r2
JX
j=1
(qj   j)2
j
, (16)
where we have used E

qj j
j

= 0 and
var

qj   j
j

=
JX
j=1
j

qj   j
j
  E

qj   j
j
2
.
This is intuitive. With inequality aversion, a benevolent planner would equalize the
average utility of all groups. It is only the presence of di¤erential political power that
leads to di¤erences across groups.
3.2 Political Lobbying under FTA
The analysis up to now has taken the lobbying e¤orts pi, and thus the weights qi, as
given. We now endogenize those values. We assume that exerting a lobbying e¤ort pi
has a per capita cost for group i members, which takes a quadratic form
c (pi) =
 
2
p2i . (17)
Observe that, given this cost function, the per-capita lobbying cost is independent of
group size. This implies that the cost of lobbying e¤ort is neutral, in the sense that the
incentives to lobby of taxpayers belonging to di¤erent groups are independent of each
group size; i.e., there are not economies of scale in lobbying.
Since the marginal tax rate ti does not depend on pi we can ignore it in the analysis.
Thus, taking as given the lobbying weights of groups other than i, the lobby group i
sets pi to solve
max
pi0
Si (p) 
 
2
p2i , (18)
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where Si (p) is given by (13). This is equivalent to
max
pi0
h

i;
pi
p

2ri
   
2
p2i , (19)
which leads to the condition
2ri pi =
@hi

i;
pi
p

@ pip
p  ipi
p2
. (20)
Using (9), condition (20) can be written as
2r p2ipi = i (;p) (p  ipi) ,
which leads to
pi
p
=
(;p)
2r p2 + i (;p)
. (21)
At the equilibrium, the condition
 =
JX
j=1
@h

j ;

2r p2+i

@
pj
p

2r p2 + j
, (22)
obtained by substituting pip from (21) into (8), has to be satised. Furthermore, mul-
tiplying both sides (21) by i and summing over i we obtain
1 =
JX
i=1
i
2r p2 + i
. (23)
A solution
 
FTA; pFTA

of the system (22) (23) is a candidate equilibrium. The
choice pi of each group is then given by
pi =
FTApFTA
2r 
 
pFTA
2
+ iFTA
. (24)
The next proposition establishes the existence of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A solution
 
FTA; pFTA

to the system (22)  (23) exists. The col-
lection
 
pFTA1 ; : : : ; pFTAJ

such that
pFTAi =
FTApFTA
2r 
 
pFTA
2
+ iFTA
is a Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game.
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One immediate observation that can be made, looking at equation (24), is that the level
of the lobbying activity is decreasing in the size of the group i. This is a consequence
of our assumption that the e¤ectiveness of e¤ort by group i depends on the ratio pi=p.
When a group increases pi it also increases p, with the latter increase being larger the
larger is i, the size of the group. This implies that lobbying is less productive for large
groups.
A second observation is that equation (24) implies that the asymmetry in size is the
only determinant of the di¤erence in lobbying activity. In fact, when all the groups are
of the same size, i.e. i = 1=J , then the lobbying activity is identical for all groups and
therefore we have h

i;
pi
p

= h (i; 1) = i for each group i. This implies that social
welfare is maximized with the correct weights, and the only costs from the lobbying
activity are the direct ones. Thus, under full tax autonomy, deviations from the socially
optimal decisions due to lobbying are possible only when the groups have asymmetric
size.
4 Minimal Tax Autonomy
In this section, we consider the case in which a no discrimination among groupsrule
is imposed, thus restricting tax autonomy. This implies that tax rates and subsidies
have to be the same across groups, i.e. tj = t and Sj = S for each j.
4.1 Taxes and Subsidies under MTA
Under the no discriminationrule, the utility of type (;B; ) is independent of the
group j to whom she belongs. Since
u  u = (   )G+       t  B  B , (25)
the variance of the utilities is equal to
var (u) = G2var ()+var ()+t2var (B)+2 (Gcov (; )  tGcov (;B)  tcov (;B)) .
Thus, the optimal tax problem solved by the policy maker in stage 2 can be written as
max
t;S
JX
j=1
qj
 
jG+ j   tBj + S
  r var (u) s.t. G = tB   S. (26)
Dene
cov
 
j   qj ; Bj

=
JX
j=1
(j   qj)
 
Bj  B

=  
JX
j=1
qj
 
Bj  B

.
Then, solving problem (26) we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 3 Under minimal tax autonomy, the optimal tax and subsidy for all
groups are given by
t (p) =
cov (;B) +G cov (;B)
var (B)
+
cov
 
j   qj ; Bj

2rvar (B)
, (27)
and
S(p) = t(p;G)B  G. (28)
To understand Proposition 3, consider rst the case in which the decision is not dis-
torted by lobbying, so that cov
 
j   qj ; Bj

= 0. In this case, the tax rate (27) is
similar to the one we found for the case of full tax autonomy. Of course, since the tax
rate is the same across groups, we have to use the distribution for the overall population
f =
PJ
j=1 jfj rather than the group-specic distributions fj . Other than that, the
principles behind the determination of the tax rate are the same. Notice that if the tax
base B is not correlated to either  or  then the optimal tax rate is t = 0. In turn,
this implies that S =  G, so that the public good is nanced through a lump-sum tax
equal for all citizens. Instead, when cov (;B) > 0, the planner sets a positive tax rate
since those who end up paying the tax are also on average the ones who have a higher
income . Thus, a positive tax rate reduces inequality. A similar reasoning applies
when cov (;B) > 0.
When political distortion is added, so that cov
 
j   qj ; Bj
 6= 0, the tax rate
changes. This is an important di¤erence with respect to the case of full tax autonomy,
as in that case lobbying only inuences subsidies. If groups with below-average local
tax base have higher political inuence, so that cov
 
j   qj ; Bj

> 0, then the marginal
tax rate tends to be higher than in the absence of political inuence. The reason is
that in this case the tendency of the government to distribute taxes from rich to poor
groups is strengthened by the additional weight which is placed on poor groups. More
in general, notice that
@t(p)
@qj
=
B  Bj
2rvar (B)
,
so that an increase in the political weight qj in principle a¤ects the marginal tax rate
in a di¤erent way depending on whether the average tax base of group j is below or
above the average tax base for the whole population. If the average taxpayer of group
j is poor, so that Bj < B, then an increase in her political inuence determines an
increase in the progressiveness of the tax schedule, by increasing both the marginal tax
rate and the lump sum subsidy. The opposite e¤ect holds for a group in which the
average taxpayer has a higher-than-average tax base (i.e., Bj > B).
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The previous reasoning however is only meant to be illustrative, since qj cannot
change in isolation (remember that the sum of the qjs has to be one). If we look at
the e¤ect of a change in the lobbying e¤ort pj we have the following result.
Proposition 4 The derivative of t(p) with respect to pj is
@t(p)
@pj
=
j (;p)
2prvar (B)
 
JX
i=1
i
pi
p
Bi  Bj
!
. (29)
Notice that an equivalent way to write @t
(p)
@pj
is
@t(p)
@pj
=
j (;p)
2prvar (B)
0@X
i6=j
i
pi
p
 
Bi  Bj
1A . (30)
The proposition then implies that
@t(p)
@pj
R 0 ()
JX
i=1
ipi
p
Bi R Bj ()
X
i6=j
ipi
 
Bi  Bj

R 0, (31)
i.e., an increase in lobbying by group j increases the tax rate if and only if its average
tax base Bj is lower than the weighted sum of average tax bases
PJ
i=1
ipi
p Bi, where
the weights of the groups depend on their contribution to p.
In fact, the last implication of (31) tells us that the sign of @t
(p)
@pj
does not depend
on pj . In other words, the lobby will always push the tax rate in the same direction
and the direction depends on the lobbying activity of the other groups. Changing
pj can change the size of
@t(p)
@pj
but not the sign. This result will be very useful in
characterizing the equilibrium of the lobbying game.
4.2 Political Lobbying under MTA
In stage 1, given the lobbying e¤ort exerted by other groups, the lobby group j chooses
pj to maximize her expected utility. The problem can be written as
max
pj0
S (pj ;p j)  t (pj ;p j)Bj    
2
p2j ,
and, using (28), we obtain
max
pj0
t (pj ;p j)
 
B  Bj
   
2
p2j . (32)
It is immediate to notice that whenever Bj = B then the optimal lobbying level must
be zero. In fact, the optimal amount of lobbying can be strictly positive only if @t
(p)
@pj
15
has the same sign as
 
B  Bj

. When this does not happen, the optimal amount of
lobbying is zero. More in general, denoting with j the Lagrange multiplier associated
to the non-negativity constraint on pj , the rst order conditions are
@t (pj ;p j)
@pj
 
B  Bj
   pj + j = 0,
jpj = 0 j  0 pj  0,
which can be summarized by
pj =
1
 
max

@t (pj ;p j)
@pj
 
B  Bj

; 0

. (33)
Among the active groups, those with an average tax base Bj lower than the global
average B push the tax rate upward, while the opposite holds for the groups with an
average tax base higher than the global average.
By substituting for @t=@pj from (30) into (33), an equilibrium can be found solving
the following system of J + 1 equations:
pj =
j
2p rvar (B)
max
8<: B  Bj
0@ JX
i6=j
i
pi
p
 
Bi  Bj
1A ; 0
9=; j = 1; : : : ; J
 =
JX
j=1
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
pi
p
dening the equilibrium. One important observation is that the level of public expen-
diture G does not appear in the system. Thus, the level of lobbying is independent of
the level of G.
Proposition 5 A Nash equilibrium
 
pMTA1 ; : : : ; pMTAJ

exists. For each group j, the
equilibrium e¤ort pMTAj satises
pMTAj =
j
 
;pMTA

2pMTA rvar (B)
max
( 
B  Bj
 JX
i=1
ip
MTA
i
pMTA
Bi  Bj
!
; 0
)
(34)
One conclusion that can be reached from expression (33) is that if Bj > B and group
j is active (i.e., pj > 0) then it must be the case that each group with an index higher
than j is also active. The reason is that, from expression (29), @t
(p)
@pj
 0 implies
@t(p)
@pi
< 0 for each i > j. Similarly, if Bj < B and group j is active then each group
with i < j must also be active. More in general, notice that for all active groups the
amount of lobbying is increasing in the distance
B  Bj. Clearly, given that under
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a uniform linear tax a balanced-budget increase in the marginal tax rate redistributes
from individuals with above-average tax base to individuals with below-average tax
base, the incentive to exert e¤ort for political inuence becomes larger the greater is
the distance of the groups average tax base from the population average tax base.
Thus, in equilibrium, poorgroups actively lobby for higher taxes, richgroups lobby
for lower taxes and middle classgroups dont lobby much.
It is also obvious that in the case Bi = B for each i the lobbying activity is zero
for each group. In the more interesting case in which B1 6= BJ , we have B1 < B < BJ
and B1 <
PJ
i=1 i
pi
p Bi < BJ for each vector (p1; : : : ; pJ). Thus, there are always at
least an active group with Bi < B and one active group with Bj > B. We conclude
that when B1 6= BJ , in equilibrium there will be an index i and an index j > i such
that all groups with i  i and i  j will be active, while groups with i < i < j will
set pi = 0 (notice that j = i + 1 is possible, in which case all groups are active).
Under MTA, both the within-groups variance and the between-groups variance
may be distorted by political inuence. A groups political inuence is related to the
distance of the groups average tax base from the mean tax base of the entire population.
Notice also that a high level of political inuence is not necessarily associated to a more
favorable tax treatment, since there may be an opposing group (on the other side of
the average tax base) that succeeds in pulling the tax rate in the opposite direction.
5 Comparing Tax Regimes
As it is clear from the analysis above, the two tax regimes yield quite di¤erent outcomes.
In this section we discuss the impact of the choice of the tax regime on social welfare.
When lobbying is completely ine¤ective (h (j ; x) = j for each j and x) then it is
clear that no lobbying e¤ort is undertaken under both tax regimes, so that the policy
maker maximizes social welfare using the correctweights (1; : : : ; J). Concerning
tax policy, for any given level of public good supply, FTA does weakly better than
MTA simply because there are more instruments available. The computations above
show that in fact under FTA the additional exibility is exploited, thus social welfare
is strictly higher under FTA than under MTA.
When is MTA going to be better than FTA? Computations are complex, as they
involve both direct and indirect e¤ects, but some observations can be made when the
direct cost of lobbying is small compared to the welfare cost induced by distorted social
decisions.
The important observation here is that the equilibrium lobbying weights qj depend
on the distances
Bj  B under MTA, while they do not under FTA. The best case
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for MTA occurs when Bj = B, so that equilibrium lobbying is zero and the cost of
distortionary lobbying is zero. On the other hand, the distortion under FTA is larger
when the sizes of the lobbying groups are asymmetric, while it is zero when the groups
have the same size. The conclusion is therefore that restrictions in tax autonomy are
appropriate for situations in which lobbying groups are very di¤erent in size (which
increases the cost of FTA), but they have similar tax bases (which decreases the cost
of MTA).
6 Concluding remarks
Real-world tax systems are typically characterized by a relevant degree of complexity.
A very large literature on optimal taxation has shown that the design of complex tax
schedules by benevolent social welfare maximizing policy makers can be justied both
on e¢ ciency and on equity grounds. Therefore, in a normative perspective, there are no
reasons to constrain the degree of autonomy enjoyed by decision makers in shaping the
tax structure. This notwithstanding, in a more positive perspective, political processes
may have a large impact on the design of tax policies. For instance, complex tax systems
may emerge either because of decision makers willingness to provide favorable tax
systems to swingvoters, or because of the lobbying e¤ort of organized interest groups.
Within this political environment, an increase in the complexity of the tax structure
may well be detrimental to welfare. Therefore, limiting the extent of autonomy that
decision makers enjoy in designing tax policies may lead, under certain conditions, to
an increase in social welfare.
The investigation of these conditions is the main contribution of this paper, which
focuses on the welfare implications of tax autonomy when governments are subject
to the pressure of interest groups. As argued above, while tax autonomy may help
decision makers to design tax policies that allow a better t with the needs of their
constituencies, it may also increase the likelihood that they end up being captured by
lobbies, hence distorting scal policies. In a simple theoretical framework, we show
that restricting the degree of tax autonomy may be welfare improving. In particular,
our analysis shows that restricting tax autonomy is more likely to be benecial when
the di¤erent pressure groups have similar average tax bases and when the groups are
asymmetric in size.
Analytical tractability induced us to make some simplifying assumptions raising
issues that need to be addressed in future research. A few are worth mentioning,
although for the most part they would greatly complicate the structure of the model
without undermining its main conclusions. First, public good supply decisions have
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been taken as given, so that the size of the government budget is xed exogenously. It
is left for future research to address the implications for tax autonomy of the interplay
between tax policy and public good provision, and in particular of the implications of
lobbying both on taxes and on the public good.
A second and conceptually more demanding extension would be to explicitly model
the extensive form of the lobbying game between the taxpayers and the policy makers,
which is taken as a reduced form in the present version of the paper. This may provide
a better understanding of the incentives to lobby under di¤erent tax regimes, which in
turn may be important in designing the optimal structure of the tax system.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (1), (2), (3) and (10), observe that
u  uj =
 
   j

G+
 
   j
  tj  B  Bj ,
uj   u = G+
 
j   

G+
 
j   
  (tjBj   Sj),
so that the within-groups variance can be written as
JX
j=1
jvarj (u) =
JX
j=1
j
 
G2varj () + varj () + t
2
jvarj (B)

+
+2
JX
j=1
j (Gcovj (; )  tjGcovj (;B)  tjcovj (;B)) , (35)
while the between-groups variance is
var (uj) =
JX
j=1
j
 
G+
 
j   

G+ (j   )  (tjBj   Sj)
2
. (36)
The objective function is concave and the constraint set is convex. Thus, the solution
can be found looking at the stationary points of the Lagrangian
L =
JX
j=1
qjuj   r
JX
j=1
jvarj (u)  r var (uj)  
 
G  T + S . (37)
The rst order condition with respect to Sj is
@L
@Sj
 qj   2rj
 
G+
 
j   

G+ (j   )  (tjBj   Sj)
  j = 0, (38)
and the rst order condition with respect to tj is
@L
@tj
   @L
@Sj
Bj   2rj (tjvarj (B) Gcovj (;B)  covj (;B)) = 0. (39)
Substituting for
@L
@Sj
= 0 into (39), we obtain the expression for tj given in the
proposition. Summing the rst order conditions (38) over j and using the budget con-
straint we get  = 1. Substituting into (38) and solving for Sj , we obtain the formula
given in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. For each  > 0 there is a unique solution p () of equation
(23). The solution is continuous, increasing and it satises lim!0 p () = 0. Consider
the equation
JX
j=1
0@@h

j ;

2r (p())2+i

@
pj
p
1
2r (p ())2 + i
1A = 1 (40)
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By Assumption 3, part (i), the LHS is strictly positive for each  > 0. Since @h(i;x)@x
is bounded, the LHS goes to zero as  goes to +1. Since limx!0 @h(i;x)@x > 0, the
LHS goes to +1 as  goes to zero. Continuity then implies that equation (40) has
a solution. Let FTA be the lowest solution. The pair
 
FTA; p
 
FTA

is then a
solution of the system (22) (23).
We now show that the solution found is in fact an equilibrium. Consider player i
and take the lobbying weights pFTAj , with j 6= i, as given. We want to show that pFTAi
is a maximizer of problem (19). Thus, suppose that lobby groups other than i set
pFTAj =
FTApFTA
2r 
 
pFTA
2
+ jFTA
:
Let
Ui
 
; pi;p
FTA
 i

=
h

i;
pi
ipi+
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j

2ri
   
2
p2i
be the objective function of group i. The rst derivative can be written as
dUi
dpi
=
@h

i;
pi
ipi+
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j

@ pip
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j
2ri

ipi +
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j
2    pi
and, by construction, it is zero at pFTAi =
FTApFTA
2r (pFTA)
2
+iFTA
. The second derivative
is
d2U
d2pi
=
1
2ri
0BB@@
2h

; pi
ipi+
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j

@2 pip
0B@ Pj 6=i jpFTAj
ipi +
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j
2
1CA
2
1CCA
 1
r
0BB@@h

; pi
ipi+
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j

@ pip
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j
ipi +
P
j 6=i jp
FTA
j
3
1CCA   ,
which is strictly negative because, by Assumption 3,
@2h

;
pi
p

@2
pi
p
 0 and @h

;
pi
p

@
pi
p
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let  be the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint.
The rst order condition with respect to S yields  = 1. It follows that the rst order
condition with respect to t is
JX
j=1
(j   qj)Bj   2r (t var (B) G cov (;B)  cov (;B)) = 0. (41)
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Solving (41) for t we obtain the value of t given in the proposition. Substituting into
the rst order condition for S we obtain the formula for the optimal subsidy.
Proof of Proposition 4. Di¤erentiating the expression of t(p; G) with respect to
pj we obtain
@t(p)
@pj
=
 
B  Bj

2rvar (B)
@h

j ;
pj
p

@
pj
p
@
pj
p
@pj
 
X
i6=j
 
Bi  B

2rvar (B)
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
@ pip
@pj
=
=
 
B  Bj

2rvar (B)
@h

j ;
pj
p

@
pj
p
p  jpj
p2
+ j
X
i6=j
 
Bi  B

2rvar (B)
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
pi
p2
=
=
 
B  Bj

2rvar (B)
@h

j ;
pj
p

@
pj
p
p
p2
+ j
JX
i=1
 
Bi  B

2rvar (B)
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
pi
p2
and, using
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
= i
0@ JX
j=1
@h

i;
pi
p

@ pip
pi
p
1A = i (;p) ,
we can write
@t(p)
@pj
=
j (;p)
2rvar (B) p
 
JX
i=1
ipi
p
Bi  Bj
!
,
as stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the system of J equations:
pj
p
=
j
2p2 rvar (B)
max
( 
B  Bj
 JX
i=1
i
pi
p
Bi  Bj
!
; 0
)
. j = 1; : : : ; J .
Multiplying by j and summing over j we have
PJ
j=1 i
pi
p = 1. Thus:
2r var (B) p2 = 
JX
j=1
2j max
( 
B  Bj
 JX
i=1
i
pi
p
Bi  Bj
!
; 0
)
.
Let xi =
pi
p and consider the system of equations
xj =
j max
n 
B  Bj
 PJ
i=1 ixiBi  Bj

; 0
o
PJ
j=1 
2
j max
n 
B  Bj
 PJ
i=1 ixiBi  Bj

; 0
o ; j = 1; : : : ; J
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This is a continuous mapping from
JY
i=1
h
0; 1i
i
into itself and it therefore has a xed
point. Furthermore, the xed point
 
xMTA1 ; : : : ; xMTAJ

is such that
PJ
j=1 x
MTA
j > 0.
Dene
MTA =
JX
j=1
@h
 
i; x
MTA
i

@x
xMTAi ,
and
pMTA =
0@MTAPJj=1 2j max
nPJ
i=1 ix
MTA
i Bi  Bj
  
B  Bj

; 0
o
2r var (B)
1A
1
2
We claim that the collection of lobbying e¤orts
 
pMTA1 ; : : : ; pMTAJ

such that
pMTAj
pMTA
=
j
MTA
2
 
pMTA
2
 rvar (B)
max
8<:
0@ JX
i6=j
ix
MTA
i
 
Bi  Bj
1A B  Bj ; 0
9=;
j = 1; : : : ; J
is a Nash equilibrium. When
 
B  Bj
 P
i6=j ix
MTA
i
 
Bi  Bj
  0 then pMTAj = 0
is clearly optimal. Otherwise, the sign of the second derivatives depends on the sign of
@
@pj

j (;p) =p
2

. Since j (;p) =
@h

j ;
pj
p

@
pj
p
we have
j
@ (;p)
@pj
=
@2h

j ;
pj
p

@2
pj
p
P
i6=j ipi
p2
< 0.
At last, observe that
@
@pj

j (;p)
p2

=
p2j
@(;p)
@pj
  22jp (;p)
p2
< 0,
which implies that whenever
 
B  Bj
 P
i6=j ipi
 
Bi  Bj

> 0 the objective func-
tion is concave in pj and the point pMTAj at which the derivative is zero is a global
maximizer.
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